http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8349954.stm
The tragic case of Baby RB highlights an extreme case for the cyborg v posthuman debate. In this case, technology was insufficient to intervene effectively in enhancing the quality of life. In analysing posthumanism, and the evolution of humans and technology, I forsee issues like Baby RB existing in the future. Technology will advance but will always reach a brink of capability. Technological limitation will always exist. I went to bed last night after reading more of the Haraway essay and a family discussion on cyborgs. The upshot of the family debate was cyborgs and posthumanism was still too much sciece fiction and society simply wouldn’t transform itself into another species.
This has raised a fundamental question for me with regards Haraway. From her point of view, all of the boundary breakdowns that identify the figure of the cyborg— nature and culture, organic and inorganic, human and animal, and physical and non physical form part of the evolutionary process of humans and technology. I can see how technology can and will shift the boundaries of human behaviour and ability. Issues of power and gender may evolve, but they will evolve from our current models, values, and institutions. I wonder if Haraway is over-reaching in her stance on power by implying it will be a completely new society. Feminism may evolve, but won’t it be constructed upon the foundations of where it was? Where does the social evolution of technology eminate from? Is it not humans who lie behind all technological creation and progress? At some point, issues around power, politics and ethics should surely influence the issue of posthuman and cyborg debate. At present, I can’t see technology as a completely non-human entity that will re-shape society regardless of social norms, values or politics.
“Could there be a cyborg ethics?” ask the editors of Cyborg Handbook, and they imagine it as “new constructions of good and evil” that they hope may help humans to deal with “cyborgian problems” . It is clear from their hope that they understand a cyborg ethics as a branch of human ethics that specifically deals with cyborgs. That is, a cyborg ethics is intended to be an ethics of (that is, about) cyborgs rather than an ethics of (that is, by) cyborgs. Given that ethics in Western philosophy has a long tradition of anthropocentrism, traced back to Aristotle, such an intention is fully anticipated. Describing happiness as final and self-sufficient and, therefore, as the good in his The Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle clarifies, “It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the animals happy; for none of them is capable of such activity”. And even in the presence of conscious cyborgs, it seems that ethics hardly steps aside from its anthropocentric tradition.
Yi: Towards Posthuman Ethics http://reconstruction.eserver.org/043/yi.htm



